If you have been in the Presbyterian and Reformed world long, at some point you have likely heard of Cornelius Van Til. He has had an enormous influence. For some people, Reformed and presuppositional apologetics are nearly synonyms. This may be surprising since Van Til is notably difficult to understand. John Frame, a prominent advocate of Van-Tillian Presuppositionalism, has written that it is “very difficult to pin down precisely what Van Til believes on a given specific topic.”¹

This prominence of a relatively recent theologian can be puzzling for those who are not presuppositional in their apologetics. Enter Keith Mathison, professor of Systematic Theology at Reformation Bible College. Mathison sets the stage for his arrival at RTS Orlando as a student in 1992 (9–10). He had three professors with differing views of apologetics, and though initially inclined toward Van Til’s system, he was ultimately swayed in another direction. Later, he began to notice some troubling currents in theology proper, with two prominent proponents of Van Til being among the advocates. So, he began to study to see if there was a connection (10–11). He writes, “Ultimately, although I did not find anything obvious in Van Til that would conclusively explain why certain Van Tillian scholars were teaching what they were teaching about God, I decided to write a friendly critique of Van Til regarding issues in his works that I found to be confusing, frustrating, or otherwise problematic” (11).

In August 2019, he published this critique online at Tabletalk with the title “Christianity and Van Tillianism.”² Mathison writes that those pushing back against his article “suggested that it was simply another rehashing of the same tired arguments that had been repeatedly answered by Van Til and others over the decades” (12). As a result, Mathison says, “[I] determined that I would not publish [this book] unless I was certain as I could be that I had properly understood and accurately represented Van Til’s system of thought” (12).

Other works have trod similar ground. Recently, J. V. Fesko published Reforming Apologetics; and from a prior generation, R. C. Sproul, Arthur Lindsley, and John Gerstner published Classical Apologetics. Both works cover similar ground to that of the current volume. Perhaps the difference, however, is one of scope. Mathison has a narrow focus—he primarily engages with Van Til. keeping his scope not on presuppositionalism in general but on Van Til in particular. The other difference of approach lies in a certain restraint. Mathison is not advocating for a particular apologetic system beyond “traditional apologetics.” Rather, Mathison is concerned with whether there is incompatibility between confessional Reformed theology and Van Til’s writings. It is not that these previous books did not make similar observations, but this treatment examines and critiques Van Til’s own work in a way these two volumes do not.

Mathison’s thesis is: “In short, I do not embrace Van Til’s apologetic system because it is neither biblical nor Reformed” (230). This is a forthright thesis, which is likely to be controversial. Two pillars are required to support this thesis: an accurate understanding both of Van Til and of confessional Reformed theology. These roughly correspond to the two sections of the book.

Part 1

In the first part of the book Mathison surveys the teaching of Van Til in five areas: (1) The Triune God, (2) Creation and Revelation, (3) Man’s Fall and God’s Grace, (4) Redemption and the Antithesis, (5) The Apologetic Implications of the Antithesis. In this first part Mathison withholds critique. Any bias would show in the editorial choices of what to highlight. The material of these chapters engages with Van Til’s own writing, sometimes elucidated by his own students and heirs.

This section is a major strength of the book. Mathison cites from broad swaths of Van Til’s corpus to present his thought as much as possible in his own terms. He also systematizes and synthesizes across this corpus, often citing across his works to elucidate central themes. Perusing the bibliography, Mathison cites widely from Van Til’s works, including his master’s thesis and Ph.D. dissertation from Princeton (271–72). You may find multiple works of Van Til cited on any given page. For instance, page 93 cites four separate works of Van Til on one topic.³

One example is Mathison’s synthesis and articulation of the antithesis in the thinking of Van Til:

It is important to distinguish the different terms to which Van Til applies the concept of the antithesis. If we fail to do this, much of what he says on the subject will be confusing. First, the antithesis between the regenerate and the unregenerate, according to Van Til, is absolute. There is no commonality between covenant-keepers and covenant-breakers, between the children of God and the children of the devil. Second, the antithesis between the two principles of interpretation is also absolute. Analogical reasoning and univocal reasoning are entirely different methods of reasoning, which lead to completely different systems of knowledge. We have to note a qualification to the concept of antithesis, however, because neither the Christian nor the non-Christian is completely consistent with his or her respective interpretive principle. (94)

This last line of course, “introduces a level of complexity,” and Mathison goes on to quote and cite five separate works of Van Til where he addresses this complexity. This thorough presentation of Van Til in his own words is characteristic of the entire first part of the book.

One possible deficiency in this section is that it is presented synchronically. If Van Til’s thought developed or matured, then Mathison’s presentation of it as a monolith does not account for this. Instead, it is presented without development. Across a broad corpus beginning with his master’s thesis, his thought is presented as a consistent whole rather than a dynamic development.

Part 2

In the second part Mathison begins his strident critique of Van Til in five areas of concern: (1) Biblical, (2) Philosophical, (3) Theological, (4) Historical, and (5) Practical. If part 1 is lacking in critique, part 2 more than makes up for it. The language in the critique section is often forthright, forceful, and striking. Perhaps if you are presuppositional in your apologetic method, it might be off-putting.

For example, in his chapter on “Theological Concerns,” he concludes, “There is no good reason for any biblically faithful and confessionally Reformed Christian to embrace [the absolute antithesis]” (190). In another example, speaking of Van Til’s infamous description of the Trinity as “one person and three persons,” Mathison concludes, “We should not be recasting Reformed theology to conform to Van Til, and we should not be recasting Trinitarian orthodoxy to conform to Van Til. Van Til is not the Christian rule of faith” (191). These are but two examples of his strong critique of the teaching of Van Til, which presuppositional believers may find overly harsh.

Mathison makes use of Van Til’s students and advocates to make some points of his critique, such as Frame’s comment cited above. Another example is a quote of George Zemek Jr., “Van Til and his followers have helped break the apologetical shackles of humanistic philosophies by providing a Scriptural perspective for apologetics; however, their arguments are not exegetically corroborated.”⁴ On the one hand, this quote serves to illustrate a common tenor of triumphalism among Van Til’s followers. Mathison though, cites it to bolster his claim that Van Til largely does not engage in exegesis in defense of his system. Thus, an enthusiastic supporter is compelled to supplement the movement by providing such a defense.

When doing so, Mathison largely succeeds in identifying weaknesses in Van Til. But where his language is strong, his appeals for mutual understanding and bearing become hard to balance.⁵ He writes, “If Van Tillians and non-Van Tillians could begin to treat each other with mutual respect as brothers in Christ, it would go a long way toward moving this discussion in a more edifying direction” (228). I wholeheartedly agree with this appeal. Nevertheless, the striking language two pages following that—“In short, I do not embrace Van Til’s apologetic system because it is neither biblical nor Reformed” (230)—will at a minimum ruffle feathers amongst those brothers in Christ who vehemently disagree.

Evaluation

Overall, the case Mathison makes is persuasive to this reviewer, who was admittedly already sympathetic. Two concerns stand forth as the most crucial in the book and relate to Van Til’s epistemology and his historiography.

Regarding his epistemology, Mathison perceptively notes a parallel between Van Til’s idea of true knowledge and the ideas of British Idealism. In short Van Til argues,

What is true with respect to the existence of the whole space-time world is equally true with respect to the meaning of it. As the absolute and independent existence of God determines the derivative existence of the universe, so the absolute meaning that God has for himself implies that the meaning of every fact in the universe must be related to God. Scripture says constantly that the world has its whole meaning in the fact that it was created for the glory of God.⁶

Mathison summarizes, “If a fact is not known in its relation to God, it is not known truly” (61). This bears a resemblance to an idea of British Idealism. An encyclopedia of philosophy notes of British Idealist Thomas Hill Green and American Idealist Josiah Royce,

The epistemological argument begins with the insight that our knowledge in some way or another always reflects the structure of our own consciousness and thought. But the difference between what any particular individual believes or even knows at any particular time and what may be true and be known as a whole, at a time or over time, is too great to ignore, and must be resolved. But once it has been assumed that thought or mind itself is the proper object of knowledge, the only way to do this is to make a contrast between individual thought and some sort of supra-individual thought. At the outset of modern idealism, in Berkeley, that takes the form of the infinite mind, God, contrasted to individual, human minds; in later forms, such as those of Green and Royce, the supra-individual mind is not always identified with God, but plays the same role. In the cases of both Green and Royce, the union of epistemology and ontology also provided the basis for a moral idealism based on an insistence upon the underlying commonality of individual human selves in the larger self that Royce called the Absolute.⁷

To disentangle this, a few things should be noted for idealists: First, the mind itself shapes knowledge. Second, it is the mind that is the object of knowledge. Basically, we do not have knowledge of an external reality, but of how our minds perceive it—and that is all we can know. Thus, a gap between what we can “know” and what is true is great. In Idealism the unifying principle that overcomes this is either God or “the absolute.” True knowledge only exists in the supra-human mind, human minds are incapable of such knowledge.

Perhaps the most important element of this epistemology is Idealist Holism. Mathison summarizes Idealist Holism: “Because every fact is related to every other fact, there is no full knowledge of any fact unless there is knowledge of that fact’s relation to every other fact” (158). Or in the language of the summary above, there is a need for a supra-human absolute to be the standard of truth. Mathison notes, “Van Til has replanted this specific element of idealist epistemology into Reformed soil” (158). He then goes on to give examples of Van Til using the idea of Idealist Holism in his epistemology, with certain necessary adaptations to a Christian theology.

 Mathison is concerned that a foreign epistemology would reverberate throughout Reformed theology with major shifts. In fact, in his final chapter, on “Practical Concerns” (213–26), he outlines some possible shifts that may be due to a change in epistemology from that of the Reformed Scholastics or the Reformed Orthodox to a Van Tillian epistemology which advocates for Idealist Holism. The Reformed Scholastics articulate an epistemology that differs from this.

Mathison provides evidence for this difference in an appendix translating theses by Franciscus Junius in his, “On God, or, That God Exists” (233–36). A few theses serve to highlight:

18. According to this conscience, the natural man knows and can be taught that God exists
19. He knows, since it is of his nature by itself to know that God exists (Acts 14; 17).
20. He can be taught, since there are certain demonstrations for God a posteriori (as they say), that is, from His works and effects.
21. There are five ways of these demonstrations from the creation of the world which have been explained by various men: the nature of things, governance, motion, the nature of the efficient cause, and its mode.

Here in these theses, Junius affirms that “natural man” is able to know and be taught about God. This knowledge is not qualified, but proofs from reason are supplied.

One finds a similar epistemology in Zacharias Ursinus who writes, “That there is a God, is proven by many arguments common both to philosophy and theology.” Ursinus then continues on to give many of the same rational arguments for the existence of God.⁸ This epistemology finds no problem in using rational arguments from philosophy, and in the case of Junius is comfortable with articulating that natural man can be taught to know God’s existence, though not taught to believe except by the work of the Spirit.

This leads to the second concern about Van Til, namely his historiography. Mathison demonstrates that Van Til advocated a “Calvin versus the Calvinists” thesis (205). Van Til, by arguing that the later Reformed theologians broke with Calvin, specifically with respect to what Van Til calls “synthesis thinking,” creates a problem.

Mathison poses a particular challenge for such a thesis. If it is the Reformed confessions which define Reformed theology, and if the confessions are written by those later Reformed theologians, then are not the confessions themselves documents produced by synthesis thinking?⁹

One must be careful—Mathison is not saying Van Til rejected the confessions. But, if the framers and major theologians of the confessional period are guilty of synthesis thinking, then it is a reasonable conclusion that the Reformed confessions are in need of, at the very least, reframing. The synthesis of philosophy and theology which Ursinus advocated above might seem to some to be synthesis thinking. If so, is the beloved Heidelberg Catechism compromised by a non-Reformed epistemology? Since it is in fact part of the Three Forms of Unity which provide a definition for “Reformed,” the question borders on absurdity. The confessions do not need to be reframed but recovered.

It is such “reframing” that is the subject of much of chapter 10. Mathison notes the effects of condemning the Reformed Scholastics:

I am not blaming Van Til for anything any of his students taught. I am merely attempting to understand how one element of his thought might have unintentionally created an environment in which the prevalence of such strange theological moves make sense. (215)

Though thankfully there are Van Tillian scholars who are also interested in the recovery of confessional Reformed theology—a fact that should be noted in this intramural discussion¹⁰— nevertheless, Mathison suggests how a historiography that de-emphasized the theologians of the confessional period seems to have created unintended negative effects in the writings of some contemporary Presbyterian and Reformed writers.

Conclusion

For the confessionally Reformed non-Van-Tillians, this book offers two main benefits. First, the first part of this book is invaluable for understanding Van Til’s thought. Second, I believe it sharpens and bolsters the case to be made for non-Van-Tillian confessionalism. Specifically, its focus on the difference in epistemology may be the key locus of discussion in the debate going forward.

For the Van-Tillian readers, I think this book offers a forceful critique of Van Til. Hopefully this work will aid and not hinder in discussions between Van-Tillians and non-Van-Tillians. This work does help by illustrating the concerns that some Reformed scholars and pastors have with Van Til, at the very least.

In all, this book is recommended for all those interested in apologetics in the Reformed world. Though at times it verges on technical and philosophical, those already interested in apologetics should be able to navigate this book. This is not a book for the student looking for a how-to guide. Rather, it is recommended for those who seek to have greater understanding of presuppositionalism and of other methods of apologetics, and their fittingness with confessional Reformed theology.

Notes

1. John Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1995), 34. Quoted in Mathison, Towards A Reformed Apologetics: A Critique Of The Thought Of Cornelius Van Til, 144.
2. Keith Mathison, “Christianity and Van Tillianism,” Tabletalk, 21 August, 2019.
3. It is worth noting that page 93 happened to be one opened in front of the author. There may be pages with more citations.
4. George J. Zemek Jr., “Exegetical and Theological Bases for a Consistently Presuppositional Approach to Apologetics,” ThD. Diss, (Grace Theological Seminary, 1982), iv. Cited in Mathison, 120.
5. Such appeals as on pp. 29, 32, 228–29, et. al.
6. Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 58.
7. Guyer, Paul and Rolf-Peter Horstmann, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta, Uri Nodelman eds. (Spring 2023 Edition), s.v., “Idealism.”
8. Zacharias Ursinus, The Commentary of Dr. Zacharias Ursinus on the Heidelberg Catechism, trans. G. W. Williard Trans (Grand Rapids: Netherlands Reformed Book & Publishing, 2015), 121ff.
9. It is the tagline of the Heidelblog that comes to mind: “Recovering the Reformed Confession.” If these confessions are marked by “synthesis thinking,” ought they be recovered?
10. For example, these include Van Tillian theologians such as Camden Bucey and Lane Tipton, though certainly there are many others. Particular thanks are due to Camden Bucey for his correspondence regarding Van Til and Mathison. Bucey’s definition of the Antithesis and his understanding of “common grace” are different from Mathison’s “absolute antithesis.” See Bucey’s definition in “The Antithesis: Understanding the Divide Between Believers and Unbelievers,” Ordained Servant, forthcoming. One wonders, however, if under Bucey’s definition presuppositionalism is then strictly required, cf. Mathison, 179.

©Luke Gossett. All Rights Reserved.

Editor’s note: In an earlier version of this review the author indicated that Mathison cited 19 works by Van Til. This sentence has been corrected to account for the fact that Mathison cited all of Van Til’s works in the Logos (electronic) version.

Keith A. Mathison, Towards A Reformed Apologetics: A Critique of the Thought of Cornelius Van Til (Fearn, Scotland: Mentor, 2024).

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Post authored by:

• Luke Gossett

  

  Rev. Luke Gossett (MA Westminster Seminary California; MA and PhD Candidate, Catholic University of America) is the pastor of Ascension Presbyterian Church (a mission of the OPC Presbytery of the South) in his hometown of Birmingham, Alabama. His dissertation focuses on the linguistic functions of the Hebrew word for “now.” Luke has been married to his wife, Jennifer, since 2014, and they have three wonderful children.

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